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The Russian leadership views the Internet primarily as a battlefield of an information war, i.e. 
an alternative to military action in the context of the ongoing confrontation with the West. 
Kremlin regards Russian Internet users who spread content critical of the Russian authorities 
as ‘enemy soldiers’ in this war. Therefore, the government has stepped up its efforts to tight-
en control over the Internet by the intelligence services and law enforcement bodies. This 
manifested itself in a proliferation of preventive-repressive legal instruments as well as in 
an intensification of illegal practices targeting free expression, the secrecy of correspondence 
and unrestricted access to information. 
So far, the government’s strategy has had limited success. This is due, to a large degree, to the 
Russian segment of the Internet being well-integrated into the global network. Together with 
other technical factors this creates an obstacle for more extensive government interference 
Hence, circulation of information in social media remains relatively unrestricted while Internet 
users are increasingly unsusceptible to official state propaganda which is being spread by 
more traditional media outlets. In this situation, the continuation of the struggle against the 
freedom of the Internet may pose a political risk for the Kremlin by stoking protest among 
Russian public. 
Internet in Russian public sphere 
and media 
The birth of the Russian segment of the Internet 
(the ‘Runet’) dates back to late 1980s and early 
1990s. In contrast to China, where the Internet 
has from the beginning been under the control 
of the state, in Russia it was initially developed 
largely spontaneously, from below, incorporat-
ing advanced communication technologies as 
soon as they became available.
According to the media research company Media- 
scope, in mid-2019 there were almost 96 mil-
lion Internet users in Russia (78% of individu-
als aged 12 and older). Recent years have seen 
a constant increase in the number of users of 
all age groups, with the group of mobile In-
ternet users expanding particularly rapidly. 
In November 2019, 100 million individuals were 
registered in the electronic state administration 
platform “Gosuslugi”. According to research 
conducted by the independent Levada Center, 
around 70% of those surveyed use the Internet 
at least several times a week (57% – daily).1
In recent years the Internet in Russia has been ac-
quiring an increasingly significant role as an al-
ternative source of information to the state-con-
trolled media (especially television which is the 
main channel for state-sponsored propaganda).
1 ‘Mediascope расширила измерения мобильного 
интернета до всей России’, Mediascope, 16 Septem-
ber 2019, mediascope.net (data for users aged 12 
and older using the Internet at least once a month); 
‘На «Госуслугах» зарегистрировался стомиллионный 
пользователь’, Радио Эхо Москвы, 26 November 
2019, www.echo.msk.ru; ‘Пользование интернетом’, 
Левада-Центр, 13 November 2018, www.levada.ru.
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According to data compiled by Levada Center, 
in 2009–2019 the proportion of Russians who 
get their information from TV fell from 94% to 
72% (an even smaller proportion of respond-
ents expressed confidence in traditional me-
dia outlets – around 55% compared with 80% 
a decade ago). In contrast, the proportion of in-
dividuals who access information from the Inter-
net and social media sites rose from 9% to more 
than 30% (the level of confidence in the infor-
mation spread by these sources has increased 
several-fold to around 20% at present, with 
clear differences between specific age groups). 
Social media sites, messenger services and 
blogs (all of which are especially popular with 
respondents under 25 years old) provide the 
main alternative to television as sources of in-
formation. They continue to be least affected 
by censorship and to serve as effective channels 
for spreading critical opinions and for mobili-
sation of grass-root social and political pro-
tests. In the 18–34 age group, television has 
been supplanted by social media as the main 
source of information. Among the youngest re-
spondents as many as 85% use them every day 
(in Russia the most popular social media include 
VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, YouTube and Insta-
gram).2 The development of the Internet makes 
it increasingly easier to publicise the cases of 
corruption, of abuse of power and of violations 
of civil rights.3
2 ‘Четверть Россиян потеряли доверие к телевидению 
за десять лет’, Левада-Центр, 1 August 2019, www.le-
vada.ru.
3 Д. Гайнутдинов, П. Чиков, Свобода интернета 
2017: ползучая криминализация, Международная 
правозащитная группа Агора, 5 February 2018, 
www.agora.legal.
Cyberspace in the eyes of the Kremlin
The Kremlin still has the ambition of establishing 
control over the Internet, thus repeating its suc-
cess in subordinating of the traditional media in 
the 2000s (by acquiring controlling ownership 
stakes and introducing informal political censor-
ship). In many aspects, Kremlin’s approach be-
trays continuity with the Soviet thinking about 
telecommunications. This approach is rooted in 
mental barriers that make it impossible to com-
prehend how the Internet functions with its dis-
persed and horizontal structure. While Russian 
security services are well aware of the nature 
and scope of the challenges and threats related 
to the Internet, they run into technical barriers 
when they try to counteract them. 
The Russian authorities’ attitude to the Internet 
as a platform for spreading information and so-
cial communication is determined by two fac-
tors. The first one is the logic of the authoritari-
an regime that views security of those in power 
and social stability as its overriding priorities. 
The other is the mentality and ingrained practic-
es of the intelligence services (with their multiple 
links to Russia’s key decision makers). In this con-
text, the passage from the official 2017–2030 
Strategy for the Development of an Information 
Society in the Russian Federation (adopted in 
2017) is revealing since it emphasises “tradi-
tional Russian spiritual and moral values and the 
observance of [corresponding] behavioral norms 
in the use of information and communication 
technologies”. The document also proposes to 
eliminate the anonymity of Internet users and 
stresses the state’s “sovereign right” to shape 
its information, technology and economic policy 
in its national segment of the Internet.4
The Chekist viewpoint typical of the contem-
porary Russian intelligence services, derived 
from the heritage of the Soviet-era KGB, results 
e.g. in the securitisation of the virtual sphere. 
4 Указ Президента РФ от 9 мая 2017 г. № 203 
“О Стратегии развития информационного общества 
в Российской Федерации на 2017 - 2030 годы”, Гарант, 
11 May 2017, www.garant.ru.
In contrast to China, where the Internet 
has from the beginning been under the 
control of the state, in Russia it was devel-
oped largely spontaneously, from below.
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This leads to a proliferation of invented or gross-
ly exaggerated “threats” that serve as a pretext 
for the security services (‘siloviki’) to pursue 
their political and financial interests, while real 
threats often tend to be neglected. The Chekist 
logic recognises neither society as a subject 
of political process nor the right of citizens to 
unrestricted information and free communica-
tion, hence the Internet is viewed primarily in 
terms of hard security and the defence of the 
state against foreign interference.5 Officials 
tend to define the Internet as a battlefield in 
the information-psychological war that consti-
tutes an addition or an alternative to military 
action.6 According to Vladimir Putin, “the Inter-
net emerged as a CIA-sponsored project and is 
still being developed as such”.7 The assumption 
about the basic identity of interests between 
the government and society makes the Krem-
lin view any independent activity (including the 
exchange of information and criticism of vari-
ous aspects of the state’s policy) as product of 
inspiration and manipulation by foreign intelli-
gence services striving to foment a ‘colour revo-
lution’. For example, this is how they see causes 
of the protest activity which has been mount-
ing among the Russian public since 2018 due to 
both social-economic and political factors. 
Years of struggle with the Internet...
Although from the beginning of its existence 
Runet has been the focus of attention of the 
intelligence services (for example, the Feder-
al Security Service has kept e-mail users under 
surveillance using the SORM-2 and SORM-3 
5 Russian decision makers use the term “information se-
curity” which is understood differently than “cyberse-
curity” used in the West, where it means the security 
of computers and computer systems. See ‘Kompromaty, 
a nie cyberwojna’, an interview with Irina Borogan and 
Andrey Soldatov, May 2017, dwutygodnik.com.
6 This logic is evident for instance in the Doctrine of In-
formation Security of the Russian Federation adopted 
in 2016 – after: Российская Газета, 6 December 2016, 
www.rg.ru.
7 ‘Путин: Интернет возник как проект ЦРУ, так 
и развивается’, Вести.Ру, 24 April 2014, www.vesti.ru.
systems8), for many years there has been no 
major institutionalised attempts to censor it. 
This began to change at the beginning of the 
2000s, but it was only in 2012 that a major 
offensive against the Internet was launched. 
It included new restrictions on the freedom of 
speech, the right to access information and the 
secrecy of correspondence. This crackdown on 
Runet users’ rights was a response to a wave 
of political protests in Moscow that accompa-
nied Vladimir Putin’s return to presidency. This 
was the first time when protests were coordi-
nated and publicised on a large scale with the 
use of social media sites. The latter also played 
an important role during the Arab Spring and 
the Kremlin clearly viewed these upheavals as 
a series of Western-inspired coups d’état organ-
ised with the use of technology developed in 
the US. The strategy adopted by the Russian au-
thorities is based on the logic of counteracting 
“information aggression” from the West and 
alleged Western attempts to destabilise Russia. 
In the eyes of the Kremlin these attempts in-
clude stoking society’s critical mood and op-
position views. Frequently, this logic overshad-
ows the legitimate struggle against terrorism 
and extremism on the Internet which is be-
ing waged by Russian intelligence services in 
the background.
8 SORM – Система технических средств для обеспечения 
функций оперативно-розыскных мероприятий (Sys-
tem of technical measures supporting operative-inves-
tigative activities). Subsequent versions of this system 
implemented from the mid-1990s were initially intended 
to wiretap telephone conversations and later to trace 
the flow of information on the Internet. Telecommuni-
cation operators are obliged to install the SORM system 
on their lines and to make their data available to the FSB, 
otherwise they may lose their licence. 
The Internet in Russia has been acquir-
ing an increasingly significant role as 
an alternative source of information to the 
state-controlled media.
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This routine struggle is often being used by the 
government as a pretext to curb civil freedoms 
on the web.9
Since 2012, a series of laws has been enacted 
to limit freedom of speech on the Internet (see 
Appendix). It is worth noting that spreading 
‘illegal’ (or politically inconvenient) content on-
line is treated by the government as an incrimi-
nating circumstance as compared to spreading 
the same content offline. This is due to broad 
access to information published online provid-
ed to unlimited number of Internet users, and 
a virtual lack of effective measures to prevent 
the dissemination of information on the web – 
both factors engendering political risks for the 
Kremlin. In this context key Runet operators 
submitted to the new rules of the game with-
out any significant resistance, and frequently 
they do block the content at the request of the 
censorship bodies, sometimes even when this 
violates the existing regulations.10 As a conse-
quence, the main instruments of the state’s 
Internet policy are online services filtering their 
content and telecommunication operators 
blocking IP addresses.11
Institutions which are formally responsible for 
the implementation of the above-mentioned 
laws frequently exploit their prerogatives in or-
der to strengthen their position within the rul-
ing regime. The leading bodies that oversee the 
9 The fact that the struggle against terrorism is of-
ten treated merely as a tool to broaden the powers 
of Russian intelligence services, makes Russia an ex-
ample of a major global trend also present in West-
ern democracies. However, in Russia there are no 
democratic ‘safety valves’ (i.e. institutions protect-
ing citizens against unlawful state actions), such as 
independent courts, strong independent media and 
specialized bodies exercising public control over the ac-
tions of decision-makers.
10 Although the Russian Internet service market seems to 
be decentralised (in total there are several thousand 
service providers), it is de facto dominated by the five 
biggest companies. These are directly or indirectly (via 
loyal businesspeople) controlled by the state. Their to-
tal share in the broadband Internet market is 70% (this 
includes the state-owned Rostelecom which has a 36% 
share). ‘Рынок ШПД B2C – 2018’, ТМТ Консалтинг, 
February 2019, www.tmt-consulting.ru.
11 Д. Гайнутдинов, П. Чиков, Россия под наблюдени-
ем, Международная правозащитная группа Агора, 
16 May 2016, www.agora.legal.
“lawful” utilisation of the Internet include two 
types of organisation: first, the law enforcement 
agencies and intelligence services, and second – 
civilian institutions. The former include the Fed-
eral Security Service (alongside the Ministry of 
the Interior, the Investigative Committee and the 
Prosecutor’s General Office), and the latter – the 
Federal Service for Supervision of Communica-
tions, Information Technology and Mass Media 
(Roskomnadzor). Aside from state institutions, 
the fight for politically ‘safe’ Runet is fought by 
censorship bodies, masquerading as NGOs, but 
established and financed by the government. 
These include the Safe Internet League created 
in 2011, which was involved in passing Russia’s 
first repressive law (establishing a single register 
of banned sites), as well as the so-called “cyber- 
-squads” operating in many Russian regions. 
Their members follow messages and discussions 
on social media sites and inform the League 
about cases of publication of banned content.12
The above-mentioned organisations keep In-
ternet users under extensive surveillance (using 
both legal and illegal methods).13 In 2018, on 
the basis of the official decisions of Roskomnad-
zor alone over 160,000 websites were blocked.14 
With increasing frequency websites are blocked 
without a prior court ruling (which in many cas-
12 ‘Регионы заводят себе кибердружины’, Роскомсвобода, 
9 October 2019, www.roskomsvoboda.org.
13 Data leaked in July 2019 (after a database of one of the 
FSB’s major sub-contractors had been hacked) provid-
ed interesting details on how the surveillance system 
works. See А. Сошников, С. Рейтер, ‘Москит, Надежда, 
Наутилус: хакеры раскрыли суть проектов тайного 
подрядчика ФСБ’, Русская служба BBC, 19 July 2019, 
www.bbc.com/russian.
14 Д. Гайнутдинов, П. Чиков, Россия под наблюдением, 
op. cit.
The Kremlin’s approach to Runet betrays 
continuity with the Soviet thinking about 
telecommunications. The authoritarian re-
gime views security of those in power as its 
overriding priority.
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es is permissible under current legislation), but 
even the legal requirement to obtain a judicial 
authorisation for surveillance activities is not an 
obstacle for the authorities as the Russian judi-
ciary serves the interests of the law enforcement 
agencies and intelligence services. In more than 
99% of cases courts automatically issue permits 
for wiretapping of citizens and for accessing 
their private electronic correspondence. It is 
estimated that in 2007–2016 surveillance activ-
ities authorised by courts are likely to have af-
fected at least 9 million citizens (around 6% of 
Russia’s population).15 However, it is not known 
how many citizens are kept under surveillance 
without a court authorisation.
...and the government’s mixed success 
Although the laws which have been passed are 
being implemented selectively and some of them 
would be extremely hard to implement in a con-
sistent manner, the authorities use them as a con-
venient ‘scare tactic’ and a deterrent to discour-
age citizens from being active in certain spheres 
and pressure them to exercise self-censorship. 
The extent of this self-censorship on the Internet 
has been rising, all the more so because even in-
termediaries forwarding someone else’s content 
(for example news aggregators) can be held ac-
countable for spreading banned content.16 There 
has been a significant increase in the number 
of Russian regions in which Internet users face 
major attempts to limit their rights. According to 
the Agora organisation, in 2018 this occurred in 
41 regions, up from 26 in 2017 (i.e. in around 
half of all Russian regions). This also includes the 
Russian-occupied Crimea, where the situation 
has been gradually deteriorating.17 
The offensive which targeted Runet’s freedom, 
resulted for example in the blocking of sever-
15 Ibid.
16 ‘«Если будем молчать, на наших кухнях появятся 
видеокамеры ФСБ»’, Интервью с руководителем 
«Роскомсвободы», Информационное агентство 
«Znak», 21 March 2019, www.znak.com.
17 Д. Гайнутдинов, П. Чиков, Свобода интернета 2018: 
делегирование репрессий, Международная правоза-
щитная группа Агора, 5 February 2019, www.agora.
legal.
al online services which refused to move data 
pertaining to their Russian users to Russian 
servers or to make these users’ correspondence 
available to security services (LinkedIn was the 
first such network, blocked in 2016, followed 
by the Zello application and the Line and Black-
Berry messenger services). At the same time, 
a much more lenient policy, resorting mainly 
to persuasion and minor financial penalties, is 
being applied to giant international actors such 
as Google, Facebook and Twitter. It is unclear 
whether these companies store their data on 
Russian servers and if so, what type of data it is. 
According to official statistics, information 
made available by these companies is rarely 
used in criminal and administrative lawsuits (in 
contrast, for example, to the VKontakte social 
media site owned by the Kremlin-linked oli-
garch Alisher Usmanov18). The statistics regard-
ing the blocking of web content inspire less op-
timism. According to the Google Transparency 
Report published in mid-2018, Google on av-
erage responded positively to 79% of demands 
from the Russian authorities to remove specif-
ic content from the web (compared with 62% 
of similar demands from the US authorities).19
In addition, repressive measures resulted in con-
stantly increasing numbers of individuals who 
are sentenced in both administrative and crimi-
nal lawsuits. The most frequently used legal ba-
sis is Article 282 of the Penal Code which bans 
the propagation of “extremist” content (which 
18 Ibid. In recent years, the biggest number of criminal law-
suits was brought against users of the VKontakte net-
work. In 2018, at least 19 users of this service received 
prison sentences (compared with a total of four users of 
YouTube and Telegram and one Facebook user), which 
accounted for 76% of all sentences of this type.
19 Ibid.
The Internet is viewed primarily in terms of 
hard security and the defence of the state 
against foreign interference. According to 
Vladimir Putin, “the Internet emerged as 
a CIA-sponsored project”.
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frequently simply involves criticism of the au-
thorities), including via the Internet. In recent 
years, each year several hundred individuals 
faced criminal prosecution for Internet activity 
(among them each year a few dozens received 
prison sentences) while many thousands were 
subjected to administrative penalties.20
International organisations which monitor hu-
man rights are aware of Russia’s attempts to ex-
pand its control of Runet. According to a report 
by Freedom House (Freedom on the Net 2018), 
against the backdrop of the growing global 
trend to curb freedom on the Internet (labelled 
as “digital authoritarianism”), Russia remains 
a “not free” country. It was ranked 53rd out of 
the 65 surveyed countries which in total are 
home to 87% of all Internet users.21
The effectiveness of the government’s efforts 
remains limited though. Resistance from own-
ers of online services and the technical literacy 
of users who are increasingly learning to by-
pass the bans by installing special technologies 
(Internet anonymizers, VPNs or Tor) may effec-
tively prevent the authorities from attaining their 
goals. Although in 2016 Roskomnadzor “black-
listed” a record number of websites displaying 
illegal content, in February 2017 65% of these 
websites were still active.22 To date, self-censor-
ship has been the least widespread on social 
media, hence the FSB’s attempts to obtain the 
so-called encryption keys which enable full and 
uncontrolled access to users’ correspondence. 
20 Ibid.
21 On a 100-point scale, where 0 means total freedom and 
100 – total lack of freedom. Freedom on the Net 2018, 
Freedom House, October 2018, www.freedomhouse.org.
22 Д. Линделл, А. Балашова, И. Ли, ‘В России продолжили 
работать 65% заблокированных сайтов’, РБК, 16 Feb-
ruary 2017, www.rbc.ru.
An illustrative example of this tug-of-war be-
tween the government and the Internet users 
is the vain attempt to block the Telegram mes-
senger service23 – attempts to obtain its encryp-
tion keys and then to block the service ended 
in spectacular failure when the service’s owner 
categorically refused to cooperate. After a year 
and a half of waging this battle the Telegram 
is still operating; however around 20 million IP 
addresses were temporarily blocked, interfering 
with the operation of numerous websites and 
online services.24
From the government’s point of view, the in-
creasingly advanced techniques and skills that 
Russians have acquired (anonymising technol-
ogies and software to bypass the blockades),25 
as well as their readiness to resort to paid VPNs 
and anonymisers, is an unforeseen consequence 
of the crackdown on the Internet – which until 
recently was the only relatively free space for 
social and political activity in Russia.
A qualitative breakthrough? 
The ‘Sovereign Runet Law’ 
Problems with exercising effective control over 
the content published online led the authori-
ties to adopt the law on ‘Sovereign Runet’.26 Its 
most likely initiator was Sergey Kiriyenko, first 
deputy chief of Russian Presidential Adminis-
tration in charge of the state’s domestic policy. 
The law’s declared goal is to devise infrastruc-
ture and procedures allowing for the centralisa-
tion of Runet management, should it be cut off 
from foreign servers (for example as a result of 
23 K. Chawryło, ‘Rosja: blokada komunikatora interneto-
wego Telegram’, 18 April 2018, www.osw.waw.pl.
24 For details see Д. Гайнутдинов, П. Чиков, Свобода ин-
тернета 2018: делегирование репрессий, op. cit.
25 After the Rutracker.ru website, containing pirated con-
tent, had been blocked in 2015, Russia took the second 
place in the world after the USA in terms of the number 
of Tor users. See ‘Kompromaty, a nie cyberwojna’, op. cit.
26 For more on this law see M. Domańska, ‘The Runet for-
tress: the Kremlin’s struggle with the ‘hostile’ Internet’, 
19 April 2019, www.osw.waw.pl. Similar initiatives were 
proposed back in 2006–2007 in the context of Rus-
sia’s deteriorating relations with the West. О. Бешлей, 
Е. Нестерова, Д. Трещанин, ‘Кто и как придумал 
«суверенный рунет». Рассказы инсайдеров’, 
Настоящее Время, 22 April 2019, www.currenttime.tv.
Since 2012, a series of laws has been en-
acted to limit freedom of speech on the 
Internet. So far, the struggle with Runet 
has had mixed success.
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“cyber-aggression” by the US). It would mean 
the elimination of Internet operators from han-
dling ‘emergency situations’. The law is also 
aimed at minimising the cross-border traffic in 
communication between Russian users. Opera-
tors will be obliged inter alia to install “technical 
measures of security threat detection” on their 
network connections (this means the DPI – Deep 
Packet Inspection technology which enables its 
users to examine the content of data packets). 
They will also be obliged to cooperate with law 
enforcement bodies in testing the Internet’s se-
curity. In addition, a “national domain name sys-
tem” is to be created by the end of 2020, which 
would be independent of the global DNS system 
managed by the US-based ICANN organisation. 
Most of the provisions contained in the law came 
into effect on 1 November 2019 and the rest will 
become applicable in January 2021. 
It seems that the law’s official rationale has little 
in common with its genuine purpose. To date, 
there has been no precedent of a country being 
cut off from the Internet by an external actor. 
In addition, at present key state institutions in 
Russia are connected by an “intranet” which 
provides for a closed circuit communication, if 
necessary, and a mere 3% of intra-Russian Inter-
net traffic is carried out with the use of foreign 
servers (for France this proportion is more than 
three times higher).27 Paradoxically and ironi-
cally, in this case greater centralisation of the 
Internet management would decrease rather 
than increase its resilience to external attacks.28
Everything suggests that the Kremlin’s real in-
tention is to perfect the tools of Runet manage-
ment in order to block Internet access domes-
tically, for example in case of the threat of the 
destabilisation of the socio-political situation.29 
27 Е. Баленко, ‘Эксперты оценили уровень «суверенно-
сти» Рунета’, РБК, 9 April 2019, www.rbc.ru.
28 ‘«Если будем молчать, на наших кухнях появятся 
видеокамеры ФСБ»’, Интервью с руководителем 
«Роскомсвободы», op. cit.
29 The precedents of such tactics recorded so far include 
blocking access to the Internet in Ingushetia (at the level 
of the entire region) during a spell of political protests 
in 2018–2019. See А. Корня, В. Кодачигов, ‘Житель 
Ингушетии пожаловался в суд на отключение 
мобильного интернета’, Ведомости, 24 March 2019, 
www.vedomosti.ru.
In this context, the ‘sovereignisation’ of Runet 
means not so much autonomy from external en-
vironment as full control of one’s own territory. 
It seems that the government’s main ambition 
is to build a “smart” system to manage Internet 
communication so as to be able to cut off, when 
necessary, specific segments of the network and 
selected groups of users in regions affected by 
social protests. This should be done without in-
conveniencing the rest of the users and without 
help from the operators. This should also pro-
vide the capability for blocking not only select-
ed IP addresses but also specific content, as well 
as for slowing-down the flow of specific data or 
online traffic on specific routes.30 
However, the technical aspects of the “Sover-
eign Runet” law’s implementation remain un-
clear. The numerous implementation provisions 
published so far have failed to dispel the doubts 
voiced by experts. It is unclear how the author-
ities intend to manage data transfer routes 
and create a “national domain name system”. 
According to available information, up till now 
the DPI technology tests have all failed and 
their side effects included a dramatic reduc-
tion in Internet traffic speed. Contrary to the 
government’s requirement, the criteria for DPI 
certification had not been set prior to the law 
coming into effect. It should also be noted that 
the DPI technology for the tests was developed 
by the company RDP.RU which is controlled by 
the state-owned Rostelecom, where Sergey 
Kiriyenko, the law’s initiator, is an influential 
30 In April 2019, Aleksandr Zharov, head of Roskomnadzor, 
announced openly that the enforcement of this law 
will make it possible to block online resources banned 
in Russia, including the Telegram.
The ‘sovereignisation’ of Runet is aimed 
mainly at preventing an outburst of mass 
social protests. It can also lead to a grad-
ual centralisation and nationalisation of 
the online services market.
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figure.31 What is more, experts disagree as to 
the technical aspects of the effective application 
of this tool on such a large scale (so far, it has 
only been applied at the level of individual com-
panies). The large-scale DPI side effects would 
pose a threat to smooth operation of Russia’s 
financial and economic sector as a whole. 
In this context, the paradox is that the costs of 
purchasing DPI systems are to be covered from 
the budget earmarked for financing the devel-
opment of the digital economy.32 
Prospects
Faced with economic stagnation, Western-im-
posed economic sanctions, deteriorating finan-
cial situation of the society and a declining level 
of support for the authorities, the Kremlin will 
make attempts to perfect its prevention and 
repression tools. Their purpose is to prevent 
an outburst of social protests on a mass scale. 
Just as with many other laws, the ’Sovereign 
Runet Law’ may for a long time remain dormant, 
especially if the political situation remains sta-
ble. However, it should be assumed that the 
testing and search for effective technologies to 
block and filter out specific content from web-
sites and electronic correspondence will be con-
tinued in the coming years. The FSB also aired 
an idea to make Runet users to use only Rus-
sian-made encryption software,33 which would 
31 Е. Серьгина, ‘Сын Сергея Кириенко внезапно стал 
вторым топ-менеджером «Ростелекома»’, Ведомо-
сти, 28 September 2016, www.vedomosti.ru.
32 Around 21 billion roubles (nearly US$ 330 million) 
was allocated for this purpose from the state budget. 
According to estimates by government experts, the total 
expenses to be borne by Internet operators in connec-
tion with the implementation of this law will amount 
to around 130 billion roubles (more than US$ 2 billion). 
See ‘«Если будем молчать, на наших кухнях появятся 
видеокамеры ФСБ»’, Интервью с руководителем 
«Роскомсвободы», op. cit.
33 М. Коломыченко, ‘ФСБ предложила шифровать 
данные в Рунете «Кузнечиком»’, РБК, 24 June 2019, 
www.rbc.ru.
permit the intelligence and security services to 
have unlimited access to content exchanged via 
Internet, including messenger services, which 
so far has not been accessible to external ac-
tors. However, it is unclear how one could force 
the entire community of Russian internauts to 
use such software. Needless to say, all these 
initiatives are sending a discouraging message 
to foreign investors. 
In addition, bringing Runet under sovereign 
control opens the way for major financial abuse, 
as well as for hardware and software producers 
siphoning off large sums of money from the 
state budget. Alongside costly implementation 
requirements, including the intelligence servic-
es’ directives, this may cause smaller Russian op-
erators and foreign companies to leave the mar-
ket, which would be tantamount to a gradual 
centralisation and nationalisation of the online 
services sector. Moreover, the continued strug-
gle against Runet may become another major 
explosive issue in relations between society and 
the authorities. In an independent survey con-
ducted at the beginning of 2019, around 70% 
of the respondents criticised the draft law on 
sovereign Runet’ and the majority admitted 
that they would personally be negatively affect-
ed by it.34 In March 2019, ten to twenty thou-
sand individuals took to the streets in Moscow 
to protest against this law (smaller rallies were 
also organised in several other cities).
34 ‘Независимый соцопрос: «Изолированный Рунет 
нам не нужен!»’, Роскомсвобода, 21 March 2019, 
www.roskomsvoboda.org.
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APPENDIX
Laws limiting the Internet freedom in Russia
Law Enacted on Assumptions
Amendment to the 
law “On information, 
information technol-
ogies and the protec-
tion of information” 
28 July 2012 The law enabled Roskomnadzor to block the content of 
certain websites without judicial authorisation. The agency 
was entitled to create a ‘black list’ of Internet sites con-
taining harmful content (including child pornography, the 
promotion of drugs and incitement to suicide). The Internet 
operators were obliged to block the ‘blacklisted’ sites. 
Also websites containing extremist materials could be added 
to the “black list” but in such case Roskomnadzor had to 
obtain a relevant court order.
Amendment to the 
law “On Protecting 
Children from 
Information Harmful 
to Their Health and 
Development”
29 June 2013 The law banned “promotion of homosexuality among 
minors” and toughened the penalties for religious offense. 
It was an element of state propaganda measures condemn-
ing the manifestations of “Western” decadence and moral 
decay and promoting “traditional” Russian values.
Amendment 
to the Penal Code
30 June 2013 The amended law toughened the penalties for public 
religious offenses (now punishable by up to three years’ 
imprisonment) and was a response to an anti-Putin perfor-
mance staged by the Pussy Riot group in Moscow’s Cathe-
dral of Christ the Saviour.
Amendment to the 
law “On information, 
information technol-
ogies and the protec-
tion of information” 
(the so-called Lugovoy 
law)
30 December 2013 The law revoked the requirement for Roskomnadzor to 
obtain a court order for “blacklisting” and blocking web-
sites containing “calls for extremist activity and mass riots”. 
Pursuant to the law, Roskomnadzor takes action at the 
request of the Prosecutor General’s Office alone. In practice, 
the definition of extremism is very broad, hence any content 
critical of the authorities may be blocked. Just as with the 
law of 28 July 2012, the context in which such content is 
published is not taken into account. In case of a provocation 
(for example placing harmful content in comments submit-
ted by Internet users), this enables the government to shut 
down any ‘inconvenient’ website. In mid-2017, Roskomnad-
zor announced that over the five years of the amended law 
being in force, 275,000 websites were “blacklisted”.
Amendment to the 
law “On information, 
information technol-
ogies and the protec-
tion of information” 
(the so-called law on 
bloggers)
5 May 2014 The law made the online publication of content increasingly 
difficult, i.a. by extending the restrictions usually applied to 
traditional media outlets on popular bloggers. The bloggers 
with more than 3,000 daily readers were obliged to register 
with the mass media regulator, Roskomnadzor, and reveal 
their personal data; they could also be held accountable for 
spreading fake news and extremist information. For several 
years, the law remained dormant; in July 2017 the provisions 
regarding bloggers became invalid due to another amend-
ment to the law “On information...”.
Amendment 
to the Penal Code
30 June 2014 The law introduced criminal responsibility for incitement to 
extremist activity via the Internet (now punishable by up to 
five years’ imprisonment).
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Law Enacted on Assumptions
Amendment 
to the law 
“On personal data” 
(the ‘Data Localisation 
Law’)
21 July 2014 The law obliged legal persons working with the personal data 
of Russian citizens to locate any databases containing these 
data solely in Russia. It was intended to facilitate the intelli-
gence services’ access to citizens’ personal data and consider-
ably limited the possibility of using foreign servers 
for independent activity. 
Amendment 
to the law 
“On Mass Media”
15 October 2014 
(came into effect 
on 1 January 
2016)
The law reduced the permitted stake which foreign compa-
nies can have in Russian media outlets to 20% and banned 
foreign nationals from establishing media entities in Russia. 
Its purpose was to eliminate popular media outlets critical 
of the Kremlin’s policy or to seize political control of them. 
The media were expected to adjust their ownership structure 
to the requirements contained in the law by February 2017.
Amendments 
to the law on terror-
ism and to the Penal 
Code (the so-called 
Yarovaya package)
6 July 2016 The law contained a controversial provision obliging tele-
communication operators and owners of web resources and 
online messenger services to store the text and audio-visual 
content sent via the Internet, as well as recordings of 
telephone and SMS conversations for six months and make 
them available to the intelligence services without a prior 
court order. Another controversial issue involved the obli-
gation to make encryption keys used by messenger services 
available to the FSB when requested. 
Amendment 
to the law “On infor-
mation, information 
technologies and the 
protection of infor-
mation” (the so-called 
law on anonymisers)
29 July 2017 The law banned the operators of anonymiser services, VPN 
networks, proxy servers and Tor networks (all of which are 
tools used to bypass blocked sites and to anonymise Inter-
net communications) from enabling Internet users to access 
websites blocked by Roskomnadzor.
Amendment 
to the law “On infor-
mation, information 
technologies 
and the protection 
of information”
31 July 2017 The purpose of this law was to de-anonymise messenger 
services’ users. From 2018 onwards it made the use of mes-
sengers subject to prior registration using one’s telephone 
number. 
Amendment 
to the law “On infor-
mation, information 
technologies and the 
protection of informa-
tion” and to the law 
“On Mass Media”
25 November 
2017
The law enabled the authorities to label foreign media 
outlets operating in Russia as ‘foreign agents’ (the ‘foreign 
agent’ status was introduced in 2012 by the amended law 
on non-governmental organisations). It also made it possible 
to block the websites of “undesirable organisations” without 
the need to obtain a prior court order (the law on “undesir-
able organisations”, enacted in May 2015, bans the activity 
of foreign and international NGOs “that pose a threat to the 
foundation of the constitutional order of the Russian Federa-
tion, the defense capability of the country or the security 
of the state”).
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Law Enacted on Assumptions
Amendment to the 
Law “On information, 
information technol-
ogies and the protec-
tion of information”
18 March 2019 The amendment package introduced two major changes to 
the Russian law intended to step up censorship on the Inter-
net. The first one involves the ban on spreading deliberate 
disinformation (fake news) which, inter alia, may ‘create 
a threat that endangers people’s lives, health, or property; 
create possibilities for mass violations of public order or 
public security’. The other amendment introduces penalties 
for publishing materials which ‘insult public morality and 
human dignity’ and manifest ‘blatant disrespect for Rus-
sian society, the state, official state symbols, the Russian 
Constitution and state authorities’. Due to the unclear and 
broad definitions used in these legal acts, and the lack of 
independent judiciary in Russia both amendments make it 
possible to punish citizens freely for criticising the authori-
ties in any form. The new provisions may de facto penalize 
the publication of any information compromising Russian 
political elite members unless such information are con-
firmed by official sources. 
Amendment to the 
law “On information, 
information technol-
ogies and the protec-
tion of information” 
and to the law 
“On communications” 
(the so-called ‘Sover-
eign Runet Law’)
1 May 2019
(most provisions 
came into effect 
on 1 November 
2019, the rest will 
become applica-
ble on 1 January 
2021)
The declared purpose of the law is to create infrastructure 
enabling Runet to operate even if it is cut off from foreign 
servers. Should such a threat emerge, a centralised system 
of Runet management is to be established (covering inter 
alia the Internet exchange points and cross-border data 
transfer).
Amendment to the 
law “On information, 
information technol-
ogies and the protec-
tion of information” 
and to the law 
“On Mass Media”
2 December 2019 The amendment expands the potential status of ‘foreign 
agents’ to private persons, above all individual journalists 
and bloggers, who disseminate information to an unspec-
ified number of people and receive funding from abroad. 
This law is another example of the Kremlin’s attempts to 
isolate Russian society from independent sources of infor-
mation. 
